while with mass nouns, we may only ask 'HOW much 7' 2 ____ It seems appropnate to speak of concrete nouns, or uses or occurrences of nouns, so as to mark a contrast with those contexts in which nouns are used genencally, or as so-called 'abstract' nouns For the fact is that the words we class as mass nouns, in such contexts, may themselves be used for counting -for counting kinds or types -and phrases like 'a wine', `one wine' and `several wines' are perfectly in order And a seems appropnate to speak of uses or occurrences of nouns, in part because some words are used concretely both as mass nouns and as count nouns not only do we have less beer', less cheese', an.d so forth, we also have the non-genenc `fewer beers' and `fewer cheeses' Again, I use the dummy mass noun `stuff', in part because its ambiguity of type and token nicely matches that of true mass nouns `Stuff is used in talk of kinds or types, but it is used in concrete reference too Where there is water in some jug, an utterance of 'the stuff in the j ug' may consntute a reference to the water in the jug, but it may also be a way of speaking of the liquid in the j ug -of speaking, that is, of the substance, water `Substance' rtself, on the other hand, In its natural-language sense, is excluswely a word for kinds or types 'the substance in the jug' can only designate the liquid in the jug, and not the water in the jug
A neglected category
Surprisingly, complete neglect of this quite basic category of nouns, and of the corresponding category of stuff, is not histoncally unusual, in fact it almost seems to be a soa of norm One wnter nghtly contrasts the outlook of 'the early pre-Socratics', with what he calls their `mass-noun ontologies' -their preoccupation with the elements of earth, air, fire and water -with that of the `count noun ontologists who carne to dominate the field forever after' 3 Hume is by no means atypical, when he wraes in the Trectuse of 'first observing the universe of objects or of body, the sun, moon and stars, the earth, seas, plants, animais, men, ships, houses and other productions '4 For ali their brevay, Hume's words explicaly encapsulate a certain general picture of the concrete world outside the mind -a picture of that world as sunply one of concrete, discrete obj ects The picture seems quite strikingly inadequate, Hume's list involves no mention of the &verse kinds of stuff which bom so large in everyday experience, as In our non-reflective thought and talk -no mennon, e g, of the water, wine or beer we drmk, the air we breathe, nor of such substances as salt and sugar, silver, lead and gold 'The point is not a point concerning terminology -not iust a matter of the fact that Hume descnbes the world as one of `objects' It is rather that his list suggests some kind of blmdness to examples of the group with which I am concerned Though such examples are, wahout a doubt, not left mtentionally from the list, their absence may suggest an marticulate awaren.ess of their unsurtabilay within a list of different sorts of things or objects there might be 5 And this serves just to emphasize a general question about Hume's, and very many other such accounts -why should one oma or somehow overlook so promment a category as this, and conceive mstead a universe exclusively of 'objects' in the first place?
The question is too large to deal with adequately in this context, I confine myself to one extremely bnef and speculative thought Nietzsche, ever suggestive, wntes that our belief zn thmgs is the precondition of our belief in logic If we do not grasp this, but make logic a criterion of true benig, we are on our way to positing as realities ali those hypostases '6 'There is perhaps a built-m tendency of under-standing best descnbed as classzcal -a tendency to seek to pin things down., to represent the world, for thought, as wholly cut and dned 7 The category of stuff resists this tendency, it is at home instead within a world-view which makes space for boundlessness, fluidity and fusion, chaos and the breakdown of distinctions 8 1 2. Phenomenology, reduction and approaches to mass nouns
Now count nouns, it is generally supposed, are quite well understood, but mass nouns are another matter altogether What has been called 'the problem of mass nouns' -which is centrally, perhaps, the problem of the logical form of mass noun sentences, and therefore also of their ontological significance -remains in my view unresolved In part, at least, because we feel we better comprehend the logic of count nouns, I here pursue an understanding of mass nouns in terms of their relationships with count nounsan understanding which will nonetheless, I hope, be nonreductionist in spint In this, my strategy diverges from what may be called the `leacling' treatments of mass nouns -a loosely constituted group of views which construe talk of stuff in terms of talk of things, or which assimilate, In one way or another, the semantics of mass nouns to that of count nouns Though mass nouns are widely perceived to resist assimilanon into our 'canonical notation', the calculus of predicates, the chief response to this is to contnve some strategy 9 whereby, ironically, resistance can be somehow overcome Contra this, the thesis I here advocate, at least in bare essentais, is extremely simple what there is which corresponds to concrete mass nouns is not obj ects, individuais or thmgs -not discrete countables -at ali, rather, it is (merely) stuff To adequately grasp this category of stuff it is of some importance to reflect, as well, on its phenomenology (where by `phenomenology' I mean a neutral or perhaps pretheoretical account of some phenomena which I suppose, In fact, to illustrate the formal, logico-semantic schema to here be introduced) The phenomenology which corresponds to our canonical notation is extremely simple, nothing is more easy to imagine than a range of discrete, persisting, concrete objects -rabbits, apples, rocks and trees -which are to figure as values of the vanables But the phenomenology of stuff and our relanonship to stuff is of an altogether different character from that of things and our relationship to things It is hardly insignificant that water, In its liquid state, is commonly selected as a central case of stuff (or that `water' is much favoured as a mass noun) There are, in an expository mode, good reasons for conceiving our relation to water as a sort of paradigm Liquid water, tnvially, does not come In chunks, so far as water is concerned, a is not implausible to say that there is nothing In particular to be identifted -no objects waiting to be picked out, no discrete itens there to be 'pinned down' 10 If unconstrained, qua liquid, water is In flux There are, of course, such things as puddles, pools and glassfuls, nvers and the lace, but these are things that water sometimes constitutes or comes m, they do not pass muster as mere znstances of water 11 (Indeed, it is precisely my thesis that, in a suitably determinate sense of this semi-artificial term, there are no instances of water ) 12 Again, there may, for any given area at any given time, be more or less of it within the area, but 'more or less' does not bring with it `objects of a certain kind' -does not bring with it `many, few ar one' -and there is not, as some maintain, a special dass of discrete objects which are In some way bus of water (so-called `portions', samples', `parcels', `aggregates' or 'quantities' of water)
The phenomenology of stuff, in short, is to be situated in as fluld character -in the absence of ftxed reference points, in terms of which our thought and our experience of stuff might otherwise perhaps be grounded As Quine remarks, water is `scattered in discrete pools and glassfuls still a is just "pool", "glassful", and "obj ect", not "water" that divide their reference ' [91] Water' by aself -the mass noun lacking individuating adj uncts -does not, he rightly clamas, divide as reference 13 Water' lacks, for as extension, a class of discrete things of which the term is true, what there is which corresponds to `water' is, quite simply, water 14 And to say (as Quine and others sometimes say) that water' does not indwiduate, is just, so I believe, to make this basic point So far as such things do exist, the 'reference points' for stuff are the contamers and the chunks -objects and not stuff And the thought that the way to `grasp' the notion of stuff is by firstly fixing some of a In a container (artifiaally `stabilising' a, so to say) -this thought falis to see that the exerase is one in which we impose our fixities on the world, and therefore find our stamp
The absence of the singular
What is perhaps the focal thought in ali of this is not a complex one To say that there is water is to speak nitely -in much the way we speak when we assert that there are cats (a is In just this mannei that we say what kinds of stuff, or things, there are) However in the latter sort of case -the case of discrete things, e g of catsdefinae assertions of existence, in the plural, may be always grounded at the 'cleeper' levei of the defintte and singular If a is true to say that there are cats in some specific region, then we must expect to speak of this cat and that cat, and so on, in that region But there is no such deeper grounding levei in the case of water -semantically, there are no elementary unas, individuais or 'atorns' to pick out And in this key respect, the relationship we bear to water is dramatically unlike the one we bear to cats, the relationslup is one which must effectively remam indefinite, and not advance' beyond this to the definite and singular 15 As Strawson in effect remarks, levei one for mass nouns are the existential ('feature-placing) statements, nothing can be more illummating than a statement with the form of 'There is water on the floor' At the risk of sounding paradoxical, the water on the floor (to which we may `refer' if there is water on the floor) might persist while not retaming its Identity -much as as the apples on the table might not remam the same through time To seek to ground existence here on something which retams Identity through timesomething in the category of Aristotle's substance -is deeply misconceived, and cruaally, perhaps, is contrary to our experien.ce of stuff 16 2. The But then mass nouns would have cognate singular `companions', and the fact that, in general, no such cognate terms exist " 'There is indeed a kinship of mass nouns and plurais, a kinship which bv now is widely recognised, if not perhaps so widely understood, but the contrast of the full-fledged mass noun and the plural is, if anything, more vital " One way to further mark this contrast would involve attending to a group of sentences involving nouns kkè furniture' and `footwear' -a group of sentences which are, while parallel to both minai groups, somewhere 'Inbetween' Syntactically, nouns in these sentences count, along with `water', `gold' and so forth, as mass nouns, but they are also linked semantically to the plural -thus 
The general structure of the mass/count contrast
Count nouns, typically, have two semantic values Semantically, they (or rather, their occurrences) are either singular or plural They sometimes signify a single thing, and sometimes many things But the fact is that in either case, the very general category they represent is best descnbed as simply that of tlungs And if count nouns thus have two semantic values, mass nouns, I maintam, have only one They are semantically neither singular nor plural, and the category they signify is best described as that of stuff (as merely that of stuff, again, and not as that of `bits' or aggregates' of stuff)
In their role as predicates, semantically singular common nouns (i e count nouns) are distinguished from nonsingular nouns (both count and mass) by their uniqueness of application, non-singular nouns which are count (i e plural nouns) are distinguished from non-singular nouns which are mass by their atomicity And as I have already intimated, these points may be expressed by way of Russell's concept of denoting That is, where 'P' is a semantically singular predicate, 'the P' denotes, just In case there is exactly one thmg of which 'P' is true (and In that case, of course, 'the P' denotes uniquely) 34 By contrast, where 'P' is a non-singular predicate, 'the P' may denote where there is no one object of which 'P' is true And where 'P' is an atomic non-singular predicate, it is a necessary condition of 'the P' denoting that there be a least amount of P of which 'P' is true The general standpoint which I advocate may now be briefly summarised as in Table I below It is because mass nouns are not semantically singular, that they manifest a certam kmship with the plural, it is because they are not semantically plural, that they also manifest a kinship with the singular 'The kinship of mass nouns and plural nouns is reflected in their shared affinity for 'ali' and 'some', and in their joint antipathy for `each' and `every'
[a] All sheep will bleat non-plural, is also, unlike that of [e], non-singular, becomes apparent rn the multrtude of mass noun sentences in whtch the `quasi-singular' and `quasi-plural' aspects of the mass noun co-exist, this would make no sense if mass nouns varied rn semantic value We have, e g , the truism
[g] This water is some water, which involves not only the non-plural `this' and the nonplural 'is', but also the non-singular 'some' Such aspects also plamly co-exist, of course, in the inalai [la] through [4a] 37 A more detailed presentation of the mass/count contrast, within the general framework as set out in Table I , might be along the limes of Table II below Here I contrast and compare the unmarked count noun `sheep' with the plural invanable count noun 'clothes' and with the mass noun `wine' -ali with respect to an incomplete variety of quantifier-expressions (incomplete, smce I have not Included, e g, 'no', `none of the', and cognates) The aim is to display some aspects of the structure of relationships between mass nouns and count nouns, and In particular to dtsplay some detalls of the kinship between count nouns in the plural and mass nouns, In relation to some varieties of quantification Points of amplification (i) Occurrences of count nouns are here classed as 'nonsingular' (i. e, for them, as 'plural') or as 'singular' depending only on what the associated quantifier calls for -an occurrence of `sheep' is classed as plural where it goes with 'ali' (cf 'ali dogs'), and as singular where it goes with `every' (et `every dog') (u.) In columns 1 and 2, what I have designated thè singular-linked non-singular' row is classed as non-singular because it takes a plural after the defmite article, it is classed as singular-linked on account of the singular quantifiers `every one', `each one', etc (A similar but non-singularlinked non-singular construction would of course be possi- ble for each of columns 1-3, thus 'some of the sheep / clothes / wine' ) (m) For a count noun in column 1, there are bare nonsingular quantifiers ('ali sheep') which -albeit within a certain range of sentential contexts -are roughly equivalent to bare singular forms of quantifier ('each sheep', `every sheep') By contrast, for a mass noun in column 3, or indeed a count noun In column 2, there are no bare singular equivalents for the bare non-singular quantifiers (w) The contrasts and comparison.s of Table II reflect the doseness of a mass noun to a plural invariable count noun, as compared with a plural occurrence of a regular or zeroplural count noun (there are no occurrences of either 'clothes' or `wine' which take the bare `every', `each', and so forth) The mass noun diverges from the plural invanable noun, precisely on account of the absence of a singular link "
Phdosoplucal remarks
(1) The general posit which informs this work, and which it is my purpose to substannate, is that (the many wnnkles notwithstanding) the syntax of mass nouns and count nouns, along quite cructally with that of their assoctated quannfiers, is a not-so-far-from perfect guide to their semantics Hence misgivings are tn order when it is proposed, as it ali too often is, to make profound 'adjustments' in the syntax of mass nouns, in order to reflect what is alleged to be their `true' semantics (II) It seems clear that unless the quannfiers 'ali', 'some', 'any', 'no' etc are ambiguous, the predicate calculus fails to encapsulate their mearung, how they are read in a given context is a function of the kmd of noun which falis within their scope (111) At a certam levei of abstracnon -the levei, for example, of the dichotomy between 'the many'and 'the one' -questions of metaphysics and semantics tend to converge Indeed, questions of the former sort resolve themselves into the latter sort But furthermore, as these semantical reflections on mass nouns are meant to demonstrate, the general categortes for what there is are not confzned to those of one and many, singular and plural, our talk and thought are not conftned to talk and thought of objects The extstence of a semantical category which is not only non-singular but also non-plural -a category which is in this sense wholly non-objectual -is the essential foundation for any metaphysical account of stuff 4a] are not And In virtue of this non-pluralay, they have no singular `reductions'-no paraphrase from 'ali' to `each' -and call for no plurality of discrete objects over which to range " They correspond, indeed, to reference, as illustrated by [5a], but the reference which they correspond to is semantically non-singular -and does not, on that account, cut any ontic ice Plural reference is reference to a number of objects, perhaps to a large number of objects, but as syntactically singular article notwahstanding, the expression 'a (large or small) number of objects' sigmfies not a single (large or small) object of some generally unrecognised type, but rather, many chstinct objects There are no distinctive unas in the extension of a plural count noun, no units matchmg as distinctive plural form So far as the understanding of 'the apples on the table' is concerned, I wish to sponsor a sort of nominalism there is no such (single) object as the apples on the table -those apples are just many things, not one And I mean to argue that just as there is no such obj ect as the (one) object of a plural reference, so, more generally, there is no such object as the (one) object of a nonsingular reference, and in particular, there is no such object as the object of a mass reference, no such object as, e g, the water on the floor
To say that what we refer to exists is, 1 take it, plainly true But to say this is not to say that the distinctive form or character of reference (always) corresponds to a distinctive form of existence, and the fact is that In the plural case it does not The category of objects in the extension of a plural noun is identical with that of the objects In the extension of rts singular twin, the extensions of singular and plural are identical 40 Similarly -and sub ject to significant qualifications considered In the sequei -mass reference consists in picking out an amount of stuff ali at once, but the stuff thus picked out is no more a unit in the extension of the mass noun than are the things picked out a una in the extension of a count noun The distinctive form of mass reference no more corresponds to a distinctive form of existence than does that of plural reference The expression 'a (large or small) amount of stuff' no more signifies a single object (large or small) than does the expression 'a (large or small) number of things' 41
The plural is, however, easy, there are the individuais of reference in the singular The mass by contrast is much less so To say that `water' is a bona fide full-fledged mass noun, and so semantically non-plural, is just to say that its extension contains no atomic units (no units corresponding to individual pieces of furniture for the case of `furniture', or to individual sheep for the case of `sheep') But to say this is to say that there are no units In its extension whatsoever For the fact that we make concrete references to water no more implies the existence of non-atomic units in the extension of `water', than the fact that we make concrete references to sheep =piles the existence of non-atomic units in the extension of `sheep' To say, in the plural, what there is which corresponds to `sheep', is just to say that there are sheep, similarly, to say what corresponds to `water' is to say that there is water (here, there, and maybe almost everywhere)
References to sheep may be, and references to water must be, non-singular, and when we make a non-singular reference to sheep, we refer neither to just one sheep, nor to a unitary group or a collection of sheep We merely refer, in fact, to a number of sheep -to many sheep, to some sheep or to several sheep -and we must resist the seemingly ever-present theoretical temptation to `reduce' the many to the one And in a kmdred way, when we make a non-singular reference to water, we refer neither to just onè water' -there is no such atomic una -nor again to a unitary aggregate of water We refer, again, to an amount of water, to some water, and here too, we must resist a temptation to reduce the non-unit to the una, the `much i to the one 42 3.1. Atoo:Italy and grounchng
There is a fundamental contrast between what I have called particular sentences which are semantically singular and those which are non-singular And here, the guiding thought is that there is much wisdom in that tradition which accords a position of privilege to the singular Particular sentences which are singular constitute grounds of a sort for general sentences -'This F is G', for instance, for 'Some Fs are G' But when particular sentences are nonsingular (e g, These Fs are G') they constitute no satisfactory ground of generality Or rather, such sentences can be regarded as grounding, just insofar as they also bring the promise of reduction to the singular, in an undemandmg sense of 'reduction' such that they promise the possibility of the (individual) identification of (individual) Fs It is just because each F is a una In the extension of `Fs', that the identification of particular Fs provides a grounding for the truth of general sentences But if, for some mysterious reason, the possibility of such Archimedean reference points were to be dented us, then particular plural sentences could claim no logical or ontological priority over the general plural sentences themselves And the possibihty of such reference points is denied us, precisely In the case of sentences involving mass nouns
Recall again the contrast of
[5a] 'The water (here) is pure and
[5b] The sheep (here) will bleat
[513], as we remarked, may be paraphrased informally in eaher of two ways -ways which correspond to one or the other of the formal sentences -so long as we are agreed that contrary to ali appearances, this is not to be construed as a formula of the predicate calculus, and is to be read merely as 'There is something which is water here, and whatever is water here is pure' -the algebraic letters receiving merely as substituends expressions of the form 'the water in this sub-region' The exerase however seems completely pomtless Since the substauends are of exactly the same type as the expres- But where there are concrete plural sentences, then of course, and as a matter of necessity, the possibility of singular sentences exists, there is a fundamental levei at winch the problems of the plural may be at least pragmatically circumvented From the standpoint of our favoured formalism, the 'problem' with the particular mass noun sentences, by contrast, is just that there is no such basic grounding levei of singulanty 'The very same combinatton of non-fundamentality and unanalysability in relation to 'ali' sentences obtains as with the plural -but without the saving recourse to the singular And so, there is a sense in which 'ali water' is itself detective, since viewed from the standpomt of the canon, it promises something on which it simply cannot deliver Canonzcally, agam, we have no proper understandmg of either [ia] or [5a] -from the standpoint of the canon, that is, both sentences are equally detective 47 In straightforwardly distributive contexts, at least, plural reference constitutes no major problem -there is some sort of prospect of `reduction' or replacement by the singular 'The same is not however true for mass reference, even when such reference is distributive
When represented in first-order predicate calculus, general sentences have a foundation-stone in the concept of an individual variable, and a is crucial to the notion of a value of a vanable in this calculus that a be, precisely, a single first-order individual or object of some soa 48 Furthermore the counterpart of the individual vanable, among substantivai predicates, is just the singular count noun A notanon based on count nouns is tailor-made for designating chscrete objects of whatever kinds -holes and dents, particular events, sheep and Anstotle's `substances' quite generally, inscriptions in the sand, and so forth Mass noun sentences are thus simply not amenable to count noun treatments -they are, in a nutshell, unformalisable in our canonical notation, but this remark, by now, should hardly 49 come as a surpnse
The thought that what there is corresponds in a pecuharly intimate way to reference is retlected no less in the calculus of predicates than in Anstotle's doctnne of substance Anstotle's principie that substance is `thissomething' propounds a certain kind of harmony between a subject, or their language, and the world Reference involves talk of this and that, and Anstotle's basic category is j ust a `this' or 'that' Substance by as very nature lends aself to being pointed out, distinguished and identified The principie is tailor-made for horses, rabbas, snowfiakes, planets and the like -things which may be counted and identified, counted one by one The principie is tailor-made exclusively for reference in the singular, a is the only form of reference which can directly designate a substance This is not a problem for the plural case, since Aristotle's harmony is re-established with the plural's grounding In the singular But it surely is a problem with mass reference, on the other hand, this reference has no grounding in the singular, it is for ever out of harmony with what there is
We do not adequately grasp the mode of being of a kind of stuff like water, when our thought of what there is is based in concrete reference As the work of Quine especially suggests, there is a unique link between ontology and singularity Questions of ontology and reference coincide, just where reference is semantically singular 5° Concrete reference in the singular reveals directly what as content is for each and every reference of this sort, there is a single concrete obj ect By contrast, non-singular modes of reference are distinctive modes of reference, which correspond to no distinctive sorts of objects With nouns which are non-singular, reference and existence must diverge, where reference is non-singular, reality and reference come unstuck And in the last analysis, perhaps, the sorts of views 1 wish to here engage are nothing more than forms of what is sometimes called the unum nomen -unum nommatum fallacy My preference however is for a concrete if unoriginal analogy the postulation of `mass objects' is akin to noticing one's footprints in the sand, but taking them to be a feature of the very sand aself
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Notes
Versions of portions of this work have been recently presented m talks at Clare Hall, Cambridge, the Czech Academy of Saences, Prague, the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, the Instrtute for Philosophy, Umversity of Salzburg, the Umversity of Wisconsin, Madtson, and at UCLA (special arrangements thanks to David Kaplan) I am grateful to those audiences for their sometimes very helpful comments, and I owe a particular debt of grantude to Alan Sidelle for his unbounded support and enthusiasm 2 For less peremptory remarks on the relanonship between the class of mass nouns and the category of stuff, see P M S Hacker, Substance the Constrtution of Reahty', rn Mtdwest Studtes Phdosophy, Volume IV (Mmeapolis, Mmnesota, 1979) 239-261 3 Jose Benardete, Metaphysics, 36-7 reckon -the use of algonthms -from semantic clanty, can make no sense of the thought that the imposition of canorncal notation as a scheme for systems of the world nught somehow meet legmmate resistance, In `our canonical notation of quantificanon', he wntes, `we find the restoration of law and order' (242) In Quine's view, a would seem, lawlessness can somehow always be qualmlessly suppressed 7 Nowh.ere are the workings of the tendency more piam, than in approaches to phenomena of reference 8 Such a world-view -or better, perhaps, a cast of mmd -is that, in essence, of romannasm And a is dose to what Nietszche calls the Dionysian attitude Nietzche himself darkly wntes of the world as 'a monster of energy a play of forces and waves of force, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there, a sea of forces flowmg and rushing together, eternally changmg, eternally flooding back with an ebb and a flood of as forms op ca #1067 The best expressions of the romannc atraude are not however m letters but in painting and music -the paintings, for example, of J W Turner and the music of Debussy Debussy writes that because he loves music, he tnes 'to free it from barren traditions that stifle a' Music, he continues, ` is a free art gushmg forth, an open air art boundless as the elements, the wmd, the sky, the sea Music is the expression of the movement of the waters, the play of curves descnbed by the changing breezes ' quoted on Debussy's Preludes book 2, performed by Gordon Fergus-Thompson 9 In a remark which is entirely representanve, an advocate of one such treatment wntes that Ins analysis "will consist m showmg how to translate sentences contaming mass nouns mto a logically perspicuous notanon' our background logically perspicuous notanon' simply is the first-order predicate calculus the task is to paraphrase mass nouns in terms of names and count nouns " T Parsons, 'An analysis of mass terms and amount terms', in F J Pellener (ed ), Mass Terms Some Philosophical Problems, 138 This is the one and only collection of essays on 'the problem' of mass terms Some central features of the leadmg treatments of mass nouns are nicely illustrated in a recent essay by a percepnve (and mdeed sceptical) sponsor of one such approach, in which the writings of a fair selection of other sponsors are cited and chscussed See Dean W Zimmerman, Theories of Masses and Problems of Constaution', The Philosophical Review, Vol 104, No 1, It is, as one writer cautiously puts it, 'eminently difficult to thmk of the Earth's water as composed of objects whtch are chscrete and inclividuated' Gregory Mellema, ---, American Philo sophical Quarterly, 1975, 165 , rtalics mine Of course with water, as with gold -and as mdeed with cats -there are lugher order' aggregates -pools of water, lumps of gold , packs of cats -but the Identity of these does not involve Identity for water or for cats Debussy's remark -essentially a remark on the phenomenological analogy of certain sorts of music and the elementsalso worth reflectmg on in this connection Debussy's art, that of music, lends aself to the representation of boundlessness and flow tn a way that the state, visual arts do not Fog, trust, cloud, and water -the stuff of his impressionism -are much more difficult to draw than static bounded objects, mountams, houses, trees and so forth The mode of existence of concrete objects readily grasped, they are intrinsically demarcated, chscrete and countable, they are emmently `graspable' -but the mode of existence of stuff is less reachly grasped, it is not so reachly grasEable As Peter Simons and, followmg han, Michael Burke have noted, 'constaute', 'constaution' and the like need handling with care, they do not, unlike 'compose', imply a one/not-one contrast 12 The water m a glass, so I shall argue, is non-singular, as existentai status is not that of 'an mstance' The concept of an stance is so to speak, a singular concept, mstances are plural, but stuff -the water m a glass e g -is neither singular nor plural 13 In one key sense of a does not mchviduate ('or', as Quine evasively remarks, `not much') The concept of individuation, it should be said -hke those of 'singular reference' and 'singular term' -is undoubtedly itself a part of the broader problem, these concepts typically mvolve conflation of the general notions of reference and 'pickmg somethmg out' with the Particular notion of reference to, or the picking out of, a single individual 14 But now m the case of (solid) gold, for example, which comes m discrete bits and pieces -this encourages, if not m fact supports, the thought that stuff 'is' things However rt helps to bear m mind that there is gold -there are large amounts of goldm the sea, but no bits and pieces 15 And there is here, m this essennal absence of the definite, an aspect of the concept of stuff which psychologtcally, at an y rate, would seem to be profoundly unsansfactory We somehow (a would seem) desire existence to be definite And it is precisely the unsansfactory condition which this represents for us, which also explams the tremendous psychological pull of atomism 16 In an eloquent passage on the ommpresence of change, Lucrenus wntes Again, in the course of many annual revolunons of the sun a nng is worn thin next to the fmger through continuai rubbmg Dripping water hollows a stone A curved plowshare, iron though rt is, dwmdles imperceptibly in the furrow We see the cobble-stones of the highway worn by the feet of many wayfarers The bronze statues by the aty gates show thar right hands worn thin by the touch of travellers who have greeted them in passmg whatever is added to thmgs gradually by nature and the passage of days, causing a cumulanve mcrease, eludes the most attentive scrunny of our eyes Conversely, you cannot see what objects lose by the wastage of age ar at what time the loss occui s The paradigm of concrete `things' ar 'objects' lies m Anstotle's category of substance, Anstotle introduced the concept precisely to theonse the phenomena of Identity and persistence through the omtupresence of change And it seems clear that the Apolloman / classical standpomt is one that is most comfortable with a substance-centred outlook on the world, but such a view loses sight of that which m changmg does not remam the same 17 It is my workmg hypothesis that 'abstract' ar genenc uses of nouns are best approached by way of thar concrete ar speafic uses, and not (Platonistically) vice-versa 18 I choose a zero-plural count noun here, =e rts syntax, if not the grammar of the sentential contexts in which it fmds rtself, comes as dose as that of any semanncally full-fledged count noun to the svntax of a mass noun And the particular predicate I here choose has the syntactical advantage, in these contexts, of making no distinction between singular and plural In fact the entire phrase hich follows the quannfier -`sheep will bleat' invanant between singular and plural forms of universal quannfier, 'ali' an.d 'each', and between semantically singular and plural readings of a definite decription 19 To avoid confusion in regards to 'some', I simply decree that its use herem is never stressed -that it is not the 'some' mvolved m talk of unidentified individuais, as in 'Some turkey spilled my but is the 'some' which among other things is used with plurais as a quantifier LO In just this sense, [1a], much hke [lb], may be said to be a dtstributtve sentence Notice that in [lal, `water' cannot be paraphrased in terms of `molecules of H20', or some such phrase, the impunty of water could hardly consist in the fact that water molecules are pure 21 Given some appropnate statement of the presence of sheep, [5b'l and [5b"1 are equally entailed by [lb] 22 To be precise, ali four sentences may be read as plural, and [lb], [2b] and [4b] must be read as plural I comment further on this matter In the sequei 23 In 'Herachtus and the bath water', Phdosophical Review 1965, 466-485, Helen Cartwnght remarks that tt plausible to speak as Quine does of "a water" and "two waters" simply inventing a count noun if one must, smce the language does not provide one ' [474] 24 just dias would be the view of one who, like Cartwnght, supposed that [1a] was equivalent to 'For each x, if x is water then x is pure' There are many differences among what I have called the leading views, but in general, they would seem to be committed to the clairn that mass nouns do mdeed vaiy m value fiorn context to context Whether this is consistent with maintaming that mass reference Is always singular is a question I do not here pursue 25 The pomt of the proviso will be obvious enough, canonical analvsis of which is a plural, calls for singular 'reduction' -'There is at least one sheep and whatever object is a sheep ' - and it is at just this pomt that [1] and [1] diverge It should be pomted out that the analysis of mass noun sentences is far more sensinve to the nature of the contamed predicates than is the case with count noun sentences Thus if [1a] were replaced by 'Ali water containsimpurines', so that instead of [5a] we wrote The water (here) contams impunnes', then we could not write 'There is water in this place, and whatever stuff is water in this place contams impunties', that would not follow, ali that would be imphed would be 'There is something which is water in this ?lace, such that whatever is some of it contams impunties'
The position here advanced should be distinguished from one which is not uncommon in the hterature -a position which characterises or describes mass reference as non-singular, but nonetheless construes it as denonng single objects On my conception of 'non-singular', that view is dose to mcoherence Among other things, it seems to involve both the view that mass nouns vary semantic value, and the view that mass reference is exdusively singular It is exammed in Ch II, and elsewhere 27 It is impossible not to nonce that there is potential conflict this argument with part of that grammancal taxonomy which embodied in the average dictionary While I speak of such terms as 'is', 'contains' and so forth as non-plural, traditional grammanans would tend to call them singular But this, if rt means somethmg more than just 'non-plural' (as it surely ought to) cannot be correct The appellation has semantic import, to call a verb or noun phrase 'singular' imputes a value of just one, whereas if I am right, this imputation must, with mass nouns, lead to incoherence The traditional taxonomy is not however carved in stone, and is hardly a consequence of sustamed reflective thought, or of any systematic theory of grammar, but merely of such superficial observations as that verbs hke 'is' are commonly enough conjoined with count noun phrases which are (self-evidently) singular `Syntax', as Leech observes in this connection, 'is much less rich in dimensions of contrast than is semantics' It is, nevertheless, worth re-emphasising the distinction between the inherent syntax of a word -the 'objective facts' concernmg its syntactic features, which may very well embody or reflect its (actual) semanttc powers -and the efforts of grammanans to mcorporate these features in taxonomy, the correspondmg theory of rts syntax (which may sometimes get it, along with rts semantic implicatons, wrong) It should therefore be dear that I perceive no tension between (the accounts I offer of) the actual syntax and semantics of mass nouns It is crucial that the grammar of a term -in this case a mass noun -not be judged merely on the basis of occurences with verbs, but also with arndes, quannfier words and so on 28 ff the role of quantifiers is anythmg to go by, they could not ali be singular, since 'ali' does not combine with count nouns in the singular The meamng of 'ali' is such as to preclude its combination with singular occurrences of count nouns -it requires the general terms with which rt is conjoined to be non singular At the same time, 'ali of the ' (along with 'some of the ') may be comomed with both plural and singular occurrences of count nouns, and 'ali' may be used with at least some proper names 29 Whatever its syntactic stnpe, if some term 'P' is to be counted as semanncally plural, tt is essential that such forms of words as one of the P' and `each of the P' make sense And where `one of the P' makes sense, there must also be the possibility of some singular count noun 'S' such that `one of the P' counts also as one S' This does not, naturally, predude the typographical Identity of 'P' and 'S' In this regard, the cases of 'caule', `cows' and `sheep' ali dtffer Quine, quite unaccountably, goes so far as to desenhe 'caule' itself as a mass term ('Ontological relativity', in Ontological Relattvity, p 36) But even syntactically -unhke, say, furniture' and 'clothing', to be considered directly -the word falis the above fairly uncontroversial test And it is precisely where a term which is syntactically plural lacks a singular companion -e g the case of `grocenes' -that we have reason to be concerned as to the bona fides of its plurahty 30 Imperfect recognition of the non-singular status of mass nouns shows up directly in accounts of their semantics, thus it is I thmk extremely unlikely that a theory of plural reference as reference to first-order sets' would have acquired anything hke the currency of the theory of mass reference as reference to `first-order aggregates', the persuasiveness of the latter view is greatly increased by the taat thought that mass reference is not in fact non-singular 31 It will nghtly be protested that the category of mass nouns is far more cliva se than 1 have so far here acknowledged [An.d also that this approach is implictly reducnve, for if `atomic' mass nouns are ruled out as non-genume, what of the non-atomic but particulatel In particular, the suggested dtchotomy between two chief groups of nouns which are syntactically mass -betweeǹ true' mass nouns, which are semanncally mass, and 'false' mass nouns, which are semantically plural or `atomic' -is espeaally misleading There are, for instance, many bona Me mass nouns which, though non-ator/11c, are semanncally parttculate `Sand', snow', `duse, 'gravei' and so on ali mvolve some nonon of constituent parndes -grains of sand, flakes of snow, etc -but in no case is there an implication of ultimacy, more coarsely gramed sand may be broken down alto more fmely gramed sand The idea of a category of `words without ob jects' is then inter alia the idea of that sub-group of mass nouns which has no implication of parttculate composition of any sort Words wahout ob jects are then words wahout an implication of particulate composinion, wahout an implication of objects constituted -unlike, say, the nonon of ice, which bemg the notion of a sohd, seems to be the notion of somethmg which must come in chunks -and (centrally) without an imphcation of bemg a type whose existence is eo ipso that of objects or `instances' Whether a certam type of stuff must have constauent particles, in the sense that a specific mass noun must be linked to a semantically plural noun, is the clearest and most readily answered question Whether a certain type of stuff, or perhaps even stuff m general, must constaute objects is less clear, there are cases such as `flesh' and `wood', where to sav that some stuff is wood is to say it was part or parts of a tree or trees Further pomt whether a noun is a bona lide mass noun or not cannot hang on whether or not a lacks constauents, ti hangs on whether we say ti is composed of Fs or just is Fs [etc] 32 [1] Although ti is consistent with the possibilay, to say that there is no (semantic warrant for the) concept of a least amount of water is not to say that water must be infmitely divisible, any more than to say that there is no concept of a smallest heap is to say that heaps must be mfuutely divisible It may just be indetermmate whether somethmg is water or not [n] A distinction must also be drawn between those nouns which are semantically atomic and those which are merely semanncally parttculate There is e g a meaning-relationship between `sand' and `grains of sand', but since granis are typically divisible mto smaller grams, the same sand need not be the same grams, and the concept of a gram of sand is not m any very straightforward sense that of a smallest amount of sand Only in the case of mass nouns which have the merest syntacttc status as mass nouns -'clothing', `footwear' and so forth -is it true to say that there is an a priori requirementand an extremely thm one at that -for 'same stuff' implying 'same parncles' or 'same elements' (m some broad sense of W articles' and 'elements') Grammar m fact permits the use of the term `amount' to cover both `amount of water' and `amount of sheep', `amount of peas', etc In this usage, the least amount of peas or sheep is just a stngle pea or sheep '54 This may be understood either as a way of explaming `exactly one thing' by reference to `semantically singular predicate', or vice-versa 35 The clama that mass nouns have no instances is then closely analogous to a ciam I would also wish to endorse, to the effect that plural nouns, qua plurais, have no mstances There is a tendency to suppose that what it is for a substantivai term or concept to have mstances is not to be distmguished from that term or concept's havmg application, for there to be somethmg which 'falis under' rt However, although rt is natural to say that there are objects to wluch the term `sheep' mav be applied -both thts sheep and these sheep, for mstance -rt is appropriate only to say that thzs sheep is an mstance of sheep, `instance', like `objece, has both singular and plural forms, and these sheep are not an instance of sheep, they are some znstances of sheep -that is, each one of them is a distinct mstance of `sheep' The plural use of 38 In fact, rt would be possible to mtroduce a further column between columns 2 and 3 -a column for just such terms as 'clothing' 39 It is, as one writer cautiously puts it, 'eminently difficult to thmk of the Earth's water as composed of objects which are discrete and mdividuated' Gregory Mellema, American Philosophzcal Quarterly, 1975, 165, itahcs mine 40 In broad outline, I would wish to endorse the argument of Richard Vallee m his paper 'Plural sentences and semannc ambiguity', read at the Fourth Analytical Philosophy Conference m Flonanopohs, Brasil 41 Pandermg to the prochvity for reification, we may say that a mass noun is true of amounts of stuff, but the facon de parler Is just that At the risk of verbal paradox, we might also say that the amounts of water in Ontano are no more discrete individual ob3ects than are the numbers of wolves within the provmce We may say that there is an amount of water m this glass, and an amount of water in that glass, but it no more follows that there are two amounts of water m those glasses, than it follows from the fact that there are a number of apples m this basket, and a number of apples m that basket, that there are two numbers of apples m those baskets In the former case, we may say once again that there is an amount of water m those glasses, and m the latter case, that there are a num ber of apples m those baskets 42 The fact that several sheep are collecnvely referred to is, m a certam sense, arbitrary or ungrounded, and has nothmg whatever to teul us about the character of the extension of `sheep' This is not however to say that we cannot introduce or define some notion of collection, such that objects which are collectwely referred to may be said to compose a collection 43 There is here no talk of `at least one ', or of `each or everv object which is ' Quantifiers are m fact employed with mass nouns, once again, but on the mass nouns' terms, and not on the terms which they apply with count nouns (It is a =e quesnon whether, lackmg variables etc , we should write 'There is something which is water ') 44 A Russelhan deftmte denotmg sentence, of course, is not rtself atomic, it too mvolves generality But correspondtng to any true Russelhan denotmg sentence there must be an atotruc sentence, on account of its semannc singularity, what is denoted may be also designated by a constant -at which pomt the generahty evaporates 45 To see the force of privilegmg reference m the singular, rt is perhaps enough to see that there is no distmct ontology of reference In the plural As I argue In chapter IV, when the question at issue is that of understandmg the category or kmd to which a non-singular substantive corresponds -of understandmg what there is in its extension -the phenomenon of reference is the wrong phenomenon to focus on, it consntutes no `ground' for statements of existence The question can be answered as with the singular -sheep, concrete individual things, etc , but we should not seek a grounding of the category now m plural reference 46 Whether singular or plural, particular count sentences are of essentially two basic tvpes -those which mvolve denottng, and those which mvolve so-called `identifying' reference, and paradigmancally, demonstrattve reference And where a particular plural sentence mvolves denoting, analysis evidently requires the mtroduction once again of 'ali', as m [m] above -and so for us is no analysis And where the sentence mvolves demonstration or identifymg reference, the sentence is neither a basic groundmg sentence -that is, an atomic sentence -nor cari it be analysed or unpacked into such sentences Plural demonstration can neither be semantically unpacked, contaming as it does no individual designations for the objects demonstrated, nor treated as semantically fundamental, being correlated one to many with its objects From our favoured formal pomt of view, it cannot but be judged detective 47 So much the worse, one might be inchned to say, for the standpoint of the canon, but matters are not, I thmk, quite so straightforward 48 Alternatively, we may say that a substituend for a variable that calculus can only be an individual constant or singular term 49 Concerning the understanding of mass nouns, Leech lacomcally remarks that 'there are vast arras of meaning on which the logician has scarcely cast an eye, rt is easy, therefore, for him to work with certain simplifying assumptions (e g that nouns denote sets of individuais, that adjectives denote discrete propernes) which do not stand up to the evidence of even such simple sentences as "Wool is warm" G Leech, Semantics, Harmondsworth, Pengum (1981), 154 50 Quantificanon captures what is said to be, just to the extent that ti captures the bona fide singular terms, the terms of our 'unequivocally referential' icliom In so far as reference is the key to ontological commitment, then it is indeed, as Quine suggests, exclusively to reference in the singular that we must look It not, of course, as if Quine even contemplates the imphcations of non-singularity He thus contrasts the singular/plural dichotomy unfavourably with what he calls 'the dichotomy between singular terms and general terms', maintanung that this latter distinction, while `inconvemently similar in nomenclature to the grammatical one between singular and plural, is less superficial' (Ibid , 90) The remark is puzzling, since the specific form of the contrast between predicates and referrmg expressions which is incorporated ato Kis (and our) `canonical notation' is preciselv that between predicates and referrmg expressions which are semantically singular -singular ia the natural-language or numerical sense
